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ABSTRACT 
 The purpose of this paper is to uncover the effects of background characteristics 
on members of Congress’ legislative activity. I intend to measure legislative activity 
using the total number of bills sponsored and cosponsored during each Congress. 
Beginning in 1973, this original dataset includes over 6,000 observations and is the most 
comprehensive study of this subject. Because my dataset begins in 1973, I will be able to 
identify any effect that the unrestricted ability to cosponsor, which began in 1978, had on 
legislative activeness. It is my intention to contribute to our scholarly understanding of 
sponsorship and cosponsorship activity in the U.S. House of Representatives and help 
shape future studies. I find empirical support for the signaling perspective which posits 
that political actors use legislative activity as a means for internal, rather than external, 
communication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
For many members of the U.S. House of Representatives, the long and exhaustive 
electoral process has become the climax of their careers, as well as one of the most 
studied areas in our discipline. While elections are obviously worthy of research, it is 
important to have a better understanding of what makes our elected representative not 
only a member, but also an active one. Are there similarities in the backgrounds of 
members of Congress that give them an advantage (or even a disadvantage) over others? 
For example, does a member of the U.S. House of Representatives benefit from political 
knowledge gained prior to taking that office? How does one quantitatively estimate such 
a relationship? Finding relationships that may help indicate legislator’s productivity prior 
to their taking the seat would benefit not only the constituents who rely on these officials 
to speak for their interests, but the political parties as well.  
The acts of sponsorship and cosponsorship at first glance seem straightforward. 
Members of Congress can either agree with a piece of legislation and formally support it 
by signing their name, or they can refrain from doing so, regardless of their personal 
preferences. This begs the question—what motivates one member of Congress to sponsor 
and cosponsor several more pieces of legislation than another member? I hypothesize that 
there is a link between individual members’ background characteristics and their level of 
activity as a Representative. In this paper, I expect to find a positive relationship between 
formal and informal education, on one hand, and increased legislative activity, as 
measured by cosponsorship and sponsorship on the other. Additionally, higher levels of 
seniority are expected to have a positive effect on legislative activity, according to the 
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signaling theory. I intend to examine these acts in the 93rd (1973-1974) through the 107th 
(2001-2002) Congresses of the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Studying Legislative Careers 
There is much to be learned from studying the careers of political actors. Hibbing 
(1999, 149) writes that, “for many scholars, a major reason to study legislative careers is 
to understand the motivation of legislators and humans more generally.” Although there 
has almost always been a desire to understand general human behavior, political 
scientists have failed thus far at conducting far-reaching studies which focus on 
increasing comprehensive knowledge of political actors. 
It is necessary to study the career paths of legislators in order to advance our 
understanding of the political mind. In my opinion, many political actors consciously 
follow a traditional path to public office. This path could include holding lower-level 
positions, such as state senators or mayors, or working as a legislative aide in order to 
gain knowledge of the political system’s norms and traditions.  
This study focuses on the backgrounds of legislators and how certain background 
characteristics may be related to their level of activity once elected to the U.S. House of 
Representatives. I measure activity as the total number of bills sponsored and 
cosponsored by each House member in a given 2-year congressional session. While 
previous studies have limited their examination to only one or two Congresses, I have 
collected data on the 93rd through 107th Congresses. This allows me to identify patterns of 
behavior and reach more general conclusions about the impact of legislators’ 
backgrounds on their performance as a member of Congress. Additionally, previous 
studies of sponsorship and cosponsorship often limit their scope to a specific piece of 
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legislation or categories of bills, such as gender related bills (Swers, 2005; Swers, 1998). 
These types of studies are interesting, yet lack the general foundation necessary to 
advance general understanding of Congressional activity. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Historical Overview 
According to Sachs (1998), a member of Congress who introduces a piece of 
legislation is known as its sponsor. “In a strictly formal sense, sponsorship of a bill only 
identifies the Representative who introduces it, and does not necessarily indicate support. 
A Member may, for example, introduce a bill as a courtesy, such as legislation proposed 
by the President. Cosponsors, on the other hand, commonly add their names to a bill to 
indicate support” (Sachs 1998, 2). Sponsorship is the real hard work of originating 
legislation. Sponsors are expected to oversee the writing of legislation, a task which 
typically becomes the responsibility of their staff. Further more, if they are serious about 
a bill, sponsors are expected to shepherd the bill through the legislative process. 
Cosponsorship, on the other hand, does not imply the same level of commitment (Burke 
and Garand, 2005). 
Since 1978, members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate have 
had the unrestricted ability to cosponsor any desired piece of legislation (Campbell, 
1982). In recent years there has been an increase in the scholarly writing on this topic. 
There are numerous opinions regarding the desired outcome from a member’s decision to 
cosponsor. Some, like Mayhew, believe that a legislators’ ultimate goal is reelection and 
that, “the electoral payoff is for positions not effects” (Mayhew 1974, 132).  However, 
there continues to be no consensus regarding the motivations or effects of sponsorship 
and cosponsorship. 
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Theoretical Perspectives 
In addition to the mixed findings reported in existing scholarly literature 
regarding sponsorship and cosponsorship, Rothenberg and Sanders (2002) note that there 
are two contrasting views to help explain the observed relationships: (1) the matching 
perspective, and (2) the signaling perspective. The matching perspective posits that 
legislators are rational actors and will seldom support legislation that is far from their 
personal or constituency preferences. Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) connect the matching 
perspective to the electoral-connection theories. This theory is based on the, “close 
correspondence between legislators’ ideological predispositions (or, by extension, those 
of their reelection constituencies) and the content of the legislation they choose to 
cosponsor. In other words, liberals should cosponsor liberal bills, conservatives should 
cosponsor conservative bills, and moderates should cosponsor moderate bills” (Kessler 
and Krehbiel 1996, 555). The electoral-connection perspective also leads to the 
implication that legislators with a lower electoral margin, who also tend to have less 
seniority, will cosponsor in greater numbers than the more experience and electorally safe 
members of Congress. 
Signaling is the view that leaders in the legislature take a position in order to 
transmit information to the rank and file members, thereby pressuring them to follow suit. 
For clarification purposes, I align the signaling and conditional party government 
theories. The conditional party government theory states that, “a unified majority party 
will try to alter the inner organizational structure of a legislature to reinforce the power of 
the party leader, and therefore enact priority legislation without any support from the 
minority” (Aldrich, 1998). This allows for the assumption that members with more 
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leadership qualities, such as party leaders, committee and subcommittee leaders, and 
more senior members, will cosponsor at greater rates than freshmen. 
For my purposes, I focus on the findings of Kessler and Krehbiel that “legislators 
do not use bill sponsorship as a mechanism for position taking aimed primarily at 
external audiences,” (pg. 563) but rather as an internal signaling device. The signaling 
theory implies that higher-ranking members and leaders use sponsorship and 
cosponsorship as a message to the rank and file members to join their effort. From the 
signaling theory standpoint, regardless of party, a strong leader should be the most 
desirable member of Congress to a voter. Therefore, the more influential a legislator is, 
the number of bills sponsored and cosponsored will increase.  
In the attempt to find out what makes legislators more likely to be an active 
legislator, I examine the similarities in several background characteristics of the members 
of the 93rd (1973-1974) through the 107th (2001-2002) Congresses of the U.S. House of 
Representatives. This is the largest and most comprehensive dataset on this subject. 
It is likely that highly active legislators may be capable of influencing their peers’ 
decisions. Therefore when a member of Congress becomes well respected, electorally 
safe, and presumably productive, the acts of sponsorship and cosponsorship theoretically 
signals freshmen, and less influential or prominent members, to support the specific piece 
of legislation. 
 To date, there has been relatively little literature written on sponsorship and 
cosponsorship or the factors that may lead a member of Congress to support a piece of 
legislation. Much of the existing scholarly work is focused on varying aspects of 
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sponsorship and cosponsorship. From my literature review, I found that there are 
basically 5 categories of hypotheses that have been studied thus far:1  
 The hypothesis that sponsorship is related to legislative expertise and personal 
preferences is an informational and normative one. It coincides with the idea that 
committees are designed to provide the members of congress with comprehensive, 
unbiased information to aid in their decision-making. This hypothesis, studied by 
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1995), found a positive relationship between cosponsorship and 
legislative expertise. However, Gilligan and Krehbiel studied only the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee. In Krehbiel (1995), the members’ preferences were found to be 
the most strongly related factor in their cosponsoring decisions. 
 There is the notion that cosponsorship in both the House and the Senate is 
somehow related to ideology, partisanship, and the electoral margin. The affects that 
these factors contribute to cosponsorship vary. Campbell (1982) found a “positive 
relationship between liberalism and cosponsorship and a negative relationship between 
electoral margin and cosponsorship.” Krehbiel (1995) found that cosponsorship was 
affected only minimally by partisanship. 
 Browne (1985) found a relationship between the act of sponsorship and 
cosponsorship and the success of the piece of legislation. That is that the more a bill 
appeared to be potentially successful, the more support it gained in the form of 
cosponsorship. Young and Wilson (1993) incorporated expertise and ideology with the 
bandwagon effect only to produce mixed results. The bandwagon effect is closely related 
to the signaling perspective. I distinguish between the two based on my perceived 
                                                 
1 Note that these hypotheses are the result of constricted data; normally the sample size only includes one 
or two Congresses.  
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differences in the rank and file member’s motivations. This assumes that the bandwagon 
effect is in place when a legislator is motivated to cosponsor after noticing the bills’ 
probability for final passage. The idea of the bandwagon effect is that a member does not 
want to miss the opportunity to be attached to popular and successful policy. It is the 
basic concept that people have a desire to win. In other areas of political science, a 
similar idea is attached to the variation between actual and self-reported voting. 
 The signaling theory is different from the above hypothesis in that the decision to 
cosponsor comes after a cue is received from a leader by a rank and file member. Related 
to this hypothesis is the work of Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), which examines the timing 
of a legislator’s decision to cosponsor.2 Kessler and Krehbiel assume that the signal is 
being received internally, influencing the members of Congress, rather than externally, 
External signaling would indicate that legislators are getting the majority of their cues 
from their constituents.   
 The widely cited book by David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 
(1974) laid the foundation for current studies of the motivations of legislators. Mayhew 
states that legislators are, “single-minded seekers of reelection, see what kinds of activity 
that goal implies, and then speculate about how congressmen so motivated are likely to 
go about building and sustaining legislative institutions and making policy” (pg. 5-6). I 
agree with Aldrich and Rohde that Mayhew’s approach “would [not] provide a complete 
accounting of congressional behavior, but [is] sufficient to explain most that was of 
interest” (pg. 269). Many authors have argued that the desire to be reelected takes priority 
over the need to create good public policy. In the context of sponsorship and 
                                                 
2 Also see Hall (1997) for a discussion of the political-business cycle which evaluates the timing of 
elections and actions of strategic political actors. 
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cosponsorship, the reelection theory would view these decisions as strategic and 
calculated moves by a legislator attempting to appeal to his or her constituents. 
 The literature currently available to the political science community on 
cosponsorship is still developing. The variation in the literature suggests that the area is 
complicated and that it may be more difficult to reach comprehensive conclusions. Much 
of the research cited above comes from studies at the individual level of analysis 
(meaning that they focus on specific pieces of legislation rather than the total number of 
bills sponsored and cosponsored). Because it is often misleading to make inferences 
about the committee of the whole from a few individuals or pieces of legislation, these 
findings may further complicate the ultimate goal of more comprehensive understanding. 
The authors of these studies acknowledge the limits of their research and it appears that 
the topic is gaining interest among scholars. The recent works of Krehbiel and others 
seem to be examining the act of cosponsorship more fully and are reaching more definite 
conclusions than their predecessors.  
 Instead of approaching the problem of understanding a member’s decision to 
cosponsor with one hypothesis, I intend to look at the big picture. Legislative activity, 
measured by the total number of bills sponsored and cosponsored, may be a result of 
many factors such as background characteristics, cues from leaders, ideology, 
partisanship, etc. By identifying and/or eliminating some key influences on members’ 
productivity, and by contributing to the theoretical basis of this area of work, scholarly 
research may be more guided in the future. 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Dependent Variables: Sponsorship and Cosponsorship 
 In order to examine the phenomena of active and less active Representatives, I use 
data on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship. Much of the previous research on this topic 
was primarily based on specific and often controversial pieces of legislation. Since my 
objective is not to uncover the motivations, likelihood, or probability of support for an 
individual bill, but rather the similarities in the legislators themselves, I propose to utilize 
the aggregate data I have collected in order to estimate negative binomial regression 
analyses on various models. Using data at the aggregate level, as opposed to the 
individual level, allows me to see the big picture and ultimately make more 
comprehensive generalizations about productivity as opposed to statements regarding 
specific pieces of legislation and/or issues. 
 To investigate the suspected relationship between the background characteristics 
of members of Congress and productivity, I collected data from various sources on over 
6,400 Representatives during the 93rd- 107th Congresses. I collected the majority of my 
biographical information from various volumes of the Almanac of American Politics. 
Data for the dependent variables were obtained from the Library of Congress website. 
When there were discrepancies, some additional information came from members’ 
homepages. Measures of ideology (Poole and Rosenthal, 2005), and congressional 
district data (Adler, 2003) were merged into my dataset.3 Finally, the data were pooled in 
order to identify relationships over time. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Refer to Appendix for detailed descriptions of all variables. 
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Negative Binomial Regression  
 The dataset used for this study is a pooled cross-sectional time series. The data are 
a collection of variables over time as well as for single Congresses. This allows for 
statistical analysis of the 15 Congresses as a whole and individually. Autocorrelation, the 
correlation of errors over time, and systematic errors are often problems associated with 
this type of data. By estimating a pooled negative binomial regression model, I can 
account for the systematic variation across individual members of Congress, as well as 
over time. Because my dependent variables—the total number of bills sponsored and 
cosponsored—are best described as events count data, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression is an inappropriate method. A Poisson model is also an ineffective tool since 
Poisson regression assumes equal dispersion of the dependent variables.4 As a result, I 
have employed a statistical method better suited than more traditional methods for event 
count data known as negative binomial regression. Negative binomial regression is also 
suitable for data, such as mine, which demonstrates overdispersion within the dependent 
variables. 
Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
 For statistical analyses, I have separated my dependent variables into separate 
sponsorship and cosponsorship models. For each legislator, I entered the total number of 
bills that were sponsored or cosponsored during that particular Congress. To test each of 
the following hypotheses, I have grouped those independent variables that I expect to 
have a relationship on the measures of legislative activity to create four models: (1) 
Socialization, (2) Leadership, (3) Preferences, and (4) Full Model. 
                                                 
4 Refer to following Results and Discussion section for graphical illustrations of the overdispersion of the 
dependent variables. 
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  Modeling the Effects of Socialization on Legislative Activity 
 Socialization, including formal and informal education, is expected to have a 
positive relationship with the dependent variables. I test this hypothesis using the 
following independent measures of political education and experience: (1) whether the 
House member is an attorney, (2) whether the House member served in the U.S. military; 
(3) whether the member held elected office at the state or local level, including mayors or 
city councilmembers, but excluding judges; (4) whether the member was formerly a 
member of the state legislature; and (5) whether the House member was a staff member 
for a former member of the state or U.S. House or Senate. A general education model can 
illustrate the relationship between various learning experiences and legislative activity. 
Members with previous experience as elected officials, such as state legislators or those 
who held a different elected office (such as mayor), should also be more active once 
elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Attorneys should be more active because of 
their knowledge of the making of laws. I expect to see a positive relationship between the 
dependent variables and a member having a law degree.5 
 As for informal education, I included biographical information from the Almanac 
of American Politics to help measure learning experience gained from working as 
legislative aides, staff members, and in other government jobs. My assumption here is 
that like formal education, informal education will also increase the productivity level of 
legislators. It is likely that working as an aide or a staffer will ultimately increase one’s 
awareness and understanding of politics and the legislative branch which should increase 
                                                 
5 The inclusion of this variable was suggested by a personal conversation with a member of the Louisiana 
House of Representatives, who contends that in order for one to create new laws, it is necessary to know 
the current ones.  
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legislative activity. Because a legislator is unlikely to be aware of their own legislative 
socialization, it is best measured through previous work experience.  
 Informal education can also be attained through service in the military. I presume 
that when one serves in the military a certain level of government knowledge is rapidly 
acquired. Although military rank or status was not considered, I hypothesize that any 
military service will be related positively to sponsorship and cosponsorship activity. 
 A member of Congress who has served in his or her state legislature, or in another 
elected office, is expected to sponsor and cosponsor more bills. I include these variables 
since it is likely that holding an elected office will familiarize one with the inner 
workings of government as well as helping to form stronger opinions regarding public 
policy, thereby testing the effects of informal education on legislative productivity. 
 Modeling the Effects of Leadership on Legislative Activity 
 Members of Congress who have previously demonstrated leadership qualities are 
expected to sponsor and cosponsor more legislation. To examine the leadership 
hypothesis, I grouped the variables in my dataset relating to leadership; (1) committee 
chair status; (2) subcommittee chair status; (3) party leader status; (4) seniority; and (5) 
gender. The reasons I included these variables are quite simple. In accordance with the 
signaling theory, the most active members are also likely to be committee, subcommittee, 
or party leaders. The members who hold these positions are expected to be the ones 
responsible for sending the cues to rank and file legislators, regardless of which party is 
in the majority. There is variance in existing literature as to how these cues are delivered 
to rank and file members.6 Legislators who hold leadership positions are typically 
                                                 
6 Visible leaders could potentially use the media as a sophisticated communication device; they not only 
alert the lower ranking members, but their constituents as well. 
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members with seniority status. Since women have only recently begun serving in the 
legislature, these leaders are more often men. Therefore, in line with the signaling and 
conditional party government perspectives, I hypothesize that party leaders, committee, 
and subcommittee leaders will exhibit increased levels of legislative activity.  
 Modeling the Effects of Preferences on Legislative Activity  
 The preferences hypothesis incorporates the ideas that extremism, low electoral 
margin, and constituency characteristics may contribute to increased productivity. This 
model includes the variables that do not clearly fit into the leadership or education 
models: (1) ideological conservatism; (2) ideological extremism; (3) party affiliation; (4) 
median income in member’s districts; and (5) electoral margin. First, using Adler’s data 
on congressional districts, I include measures of district median income. The variable is 
used as an attempt to measure political activism and engagement on the part of House 
members’ constituencies. I speculate that congressional districts with a higher median 
income will elect more active Representatives, so median income should be positively 
related to sponsorship and cosponsorship activity. Related to the electoral-connection 
theory is the idea that freshmen members, often elected in close races, are more likely to 
have an increased number of sponsored and cosponsored bills in order to appeal to their 
constituents during reelection. These freshmen legislators with small electoral margins 
are also likely to be representing competitive districts. Sponsoring and cosponsoring 
more legislation, especially distributive bills, is expected to be helpful in their reelection 
campaigns. Specifically, this group of legislators is expected to be more active in order to 
facilitate their own reelection.7 
                                                 
7 Refer to earlier discussion of Mayhew (1974). 
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  Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate scores measure legislators’ ideological 
conservatism. I speculate, holding all other variables constant, that more conservative 
legislators will sponsor and cosponsor less than their liberal peers because these members 
are more likely to promote the limited role of government point of view. The folded 
Poole and Rosenthal score is a measure included to capture ideological extremism on 
both sides of the spectrum. Since members with extreme ideological beliefs are likely to 
sponsor and cosponsor before many of their moderate peers, I expect to see a positive 
relationship between legislators with extreme ideological positions and the dependent 
variables. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
What explains patterns of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity in the U.S. 
House of Representatives? In Table 1, I provide an overview of the statistical analyses. 
These tables indicate negative binomial regression coefficients for the combined 15 
Congresses. This allows for comparisons of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity, as 
well as observing trends over time. 
I have provided some basic descriptive information about the dependent variables. 
In Figures 1 and 2, I show the distribution of bills for both sponsorship and cosponsorship 
with a box plot. Beginning in 1978, during the 95th Congress, legislators gained the 
unrestricted ability to cosponsor legislation. This change is notable in the 96th Congress, 
1979-1980.  
The pattern of sponsorship, shown in Figure 1, illustrates the gradual decline in 
activity over time. Clearly, the changes which occurred in 1978 had a tangible impact on 
sponsorship and cosponsorship activity. In the 93rd Congress (1973-1974), the mean 
number of bills sponsored is 47.8, with a standard deviation of 39.26. In the 107th 
Congress (2001-2002), the mean of sponsored bills fell to just 17.16, with a standard 
deviation of 13.08.  
Meanwhile, Figure 2 shows cosponsorship activity in the early years of this 
dataset results in a mean of 103.09 pieces of legislation and a standard deviation of 
104.05. In the most recent Congress studied, the 107th (2001-2002), the mean for 
cosponsorship activity rose to 276.05 with a standard deviation of 148.57. Notice how in 
Figure 2 the pattern of cosponsorship increases dramatically around the same time as the 
ability to freely cosponsor came about. This indicates that the act of cosponsorship can be 
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considered less costly to a member of Congress than sponsorship. Cosponsoring 
legislation is the formal acknowledgement of support, as opposed to sponsorship which 
includes drafting and managing a piece of legislation. The much more time-consuming 
task of sponsorship appears to be on the decline. The mean number of bills sponsored is 
24.2, with a standard deviation of 24.3. The mean number of bills cosponsored, however, 
is 252.2, with a standard deviation of 153.97.  
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Figure 1. Total number of bills sponsored, full model of sponsorship behavior, U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) to 2001-2002 (107th Congress). 
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Figure 2. Total number of bills cosponsored, full model of cosponsorship behavior, 
U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) to 2001-2002 (107th 
Congress). 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the frequency of sponsored legislation for each of the 15 
Congresses studied. Notice the jump in activity, especially during the 96th Congress. 
Recall that the 96th Congress marks the beginning of the unrestricted ability to cosponsor 
which was enacted just one year prior; this pattern is maintained throughout the sample.   
Comparatively, Figure 4 represents patterns of cosponsorship activity in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, 1973-2002. Unlike sponsorship, this illustration shows little 
variation in legislative activity. In the 96th Congress there was a sharp increase in 
sponsorship activity. However, it appears not to be the case for cosponsorship. One can 
see the slight increase in activity, but it is not as extreme as was seen in Figure 3.  
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Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the patterns of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity 
over the time period studied, 1973-2002. It is noticeable that the changes which took 
place around the 96th Congress significantly affected legislative activity. These figures 
also show the dependent variables are consistently skewed sharply to the right which 
further illustrates the need for the negative binomial regression method. 
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Figure 3. Graphic representation of total number of bills sponsored during each 
Congress, 1973-2002. 
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Figure 4. Graphic representation of total number of bills cosponsored during each 
Congress, 1973-2002. 
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Table 1. Negative binomial regression results, full models of sponsorship and 
cosponsorship behavior, U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) 
to 2001-2002 (107th Congress). 
 
 
           Sponsorship    Cosponsorship     
                  
             b     Z    b   Z 
 
 
Member characteristics 
 
 Gender [+]        0.096     1.50*   0.139   3.05*** 
 Party [-]         0.209     2.88***  0.137   2.71***   
 
Spatial variables 
 
 DW-Nominate [-]     -0.339    -3.46***  -0.579  -9.51*** 
 Folded DW-Nominate [+]     0.379         3.03***   0.438   5.99*** 
 
Legislative experience  
 
 Attorney [+]        0.013     0.38   -0.042  -1.80* 
 Mentored [+]       0.027     0.78   -0.015  -0.63 
 Military [+]        0.067     1.90**   -0.057  -2.20** 
 State legislator [+]           -0.027    -0.92    0.073   3.53*** 
 State or local elected official [+]   0.114     3.67***   0.071   3.20*** 
 Seniority [+]        0.016     6.74***  -0.010  -6.19*** 
 
Institutional position 
 
 Party leader [+]       0.006     0.16   -0.025  -0.82 
 Committee chair [+]      0.142     3.15***   0.025   0.83 
 Subcommittee chair [+]     0.133     5.11***   0.074   4.56*** 
 
Constituent Pressure 
 
 Median income [+]     -0.000005   -3.44***  -0.000003 -3.41*** 
 Election margin [+]      0.004     5.24***   0.0012   2.56*** 
  
Legislative context 
 
 Cosponsorship reform (post-1978)   -0.692  -18.87      [+] 0.535  23.24*** 
 
N            6483          6483     
Pseudo-R2        
Model Chi-square        1026.50          1187.33 
Prob (Chi-square)  0.0000          0.0000 
 
 
 
 22
Sponsorship Results 
 The signaling perspective posits that leaders use legislative activity to motivate or 
inform the rank and file members. This model finds support for the signaling hypothesis 
because seniority, committee chair status, and subcommittee chair status can be viewed 
as positions of leadership within the legislature. As hypothesized, leadership variables 
have a positive and statistically significant relationship to sponsorship. Seniority has a 
strong relationship (b = 0.016, Z = 6.74) to sponsorship activity. This indicates that more 
experienced members of Congress are sponsoring more legislation than freshmen 
members. Serving as a committee chair also has a positive impact on sponsorship activity 
(b = 0.142, Z = 3.15), as seen in Table 1. Also, subcommittee chair status also has a 
positive relationship to sponsorship activity (b = 0.133, Z = 5.11). However, the variable 
measuring party leadership has little effect on the sponsorship of legislation (b = 0.006, Z 
= 0.16). Together, the leadership variables indicate support for the signaling perspective. 
 The socialization of legislators, on the other hand, likely occurs once the member 
has been elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Variables indicating previous 
education and socialization are seen to have little impact on sponsorship activity. There 
is, however, a connection between legislators with local political experience and their 
sponsorship activity. Many of the variables representing the socialization hypothesis did 
not have statistically significant coefficients. Neither legal education, service with the 
military, working as a legislative aide, nor holding state legislative positions significantly 
affects legislative activity in the U.S. House of Representatives. However, serving as a 
state or local official does have a statistically significant relationship to legislative 
activity in the hypothesized direction. These political actors may feel more obligated to 
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bring distributive legislation to their constituents. The variable has a strong coefficient (b 
= 0.114, Z = 3.67) which indicates the need for additional research of this relationship.  
There is also a modest relationship between gender and sponsorship behavior. The 
effect of gender is especially interesting because it indicates that women are sponsoring 
legislation at a higher rate than their male counterparts (b = 0.096, Z = 1.50). Existing 
literature using data at the state level (Bratton and Haynie, 1999) finds support to the 
contrary. Additional research on this variable could help clarify the observed relationship 
between gender and sponsorship activity. 
Personal preferences—including scores of ideological extremism, partisanship, 
and electoral margin—also indicate a statistically significant relationship in the 
hypothesized direction. Ideological extremism was expected to have a positive 
relationship with legislative activity. This model indicates a statistically significant 
coefficient (b = 0.379, Z = 3.03) in the hypothesized direction.  DW-Nominate scores, 
however, resulted in a relationship that is in the opposite direction (b = -0.339, Z = -3.46). 
The coefficient for party (b = 0.209, Z = 2.88) in Table 1 represents the effect of being a 
member of the Republican party. Unexpectedly, this variable produced a statistically 
significant coefficient in the positive direction. This indicates that Republican members 
are actually sponsoring more legislation than their Democratic peers.  
Cosponsorship Results 
  Cosponsorship behavior is particularly interesting in this study because I had the 
unprecedented opportunity to observe changes in this activity over time. As mentioned 
earlier in this paper, in 1978 members of Congress gained the unrestricted ability to 
cosponsor legislation. Figure 2 illustrates the apparent, and steady, increase in 
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cosponsorship activity through the late 1970’s and 1980’s. Cosponsorship activity peaked 
during the 101st Congress (1989-1990) when members averaged 375.4 pieces of 
legislation. During the Republican-controlled Congress of 1994, levels of cosponsorship 
activity returned to their pre-1978 state.  
  In Tables 2 and 3, I show the top ten sponsors and cosponsors of legislation for 
the combined 15 Congresses. These members noticeably have one common denominator; 
they are mostly members of the Democratic party.  
 
Table 2. List of the top ten most active legislators, full model of sponsorship 
behavior, U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) to 2001-2002 
(107th Congress). 
 
      Congress            Name                State           Number of Sponsored Bills 
1.  95  Roe  New Jersey  325 
2.  94  Pepper  Florida   309 
3.  95  Murphy New York  288 
4.  93  Roe  New Jersey  287 
5.  94  Koch  New York  283 
6.  95  Pepper  Florida   277 
7.  94  Murphy New York  250 
8.  93  Roybal  California  242 
9.  93  Koch  New York  225 
10.  93  Helstoski New Jersey  218 
 
Table 3.   List of the top ten most active legislators, full model of cosponsorship 
behavior, U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-1974 (93rd Congress) to 2001-2002 
(107th Congress). 
 
      Congress      Name                  State           Number of Cosponsored Bills 
1.  99  Martinez California  1152 
2.  101  Collins  Illinois   1141 
3.  100  Lagomarsino California  1070 
4.  101  Towns  New York  1062 
5.  102  Towns  New York  1015 
6.  100  Martinez California  1011 
7.  100  Towns  New York  999 
8.  99  Kaptur  Ohio   986 
9.  107  Frost  Texas   961 
10.  102  Horton  New York  959 
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  Additionally, Figure 3 illustrates the frequency of sponsored legislation for each 
of the 15 Congresses studied. Notice the jump in activity, especially during the 96th 
Congress. Recall that the 96th Congress marks the beginning of the unrestricted ability to 
cosponsor which was enacted just one year prior. This pattern is maintained throughout 
the sample. Comparatively, Figure 4 represents patterns of cosponsorship activity in the 
U.S. House of Representatives, 1973-2002. Unlike sponsorship, this illustration shows 
little variation in legislative activity. In the 96th Congress there was a sharp increase in 
sponsorship activity. However, it appears not to be the case for cosponsorship. One can 
see the slight increase in activity, but it is not as extreme as was seen in Figure 3. While a 
strong increasing pattern of cosponsorship does not appear at first glace, simple 
mathematical means reveal a significant amount of activity. 
  The models of cosponsorship also yielded interesting findings. Unlike 
sponsorship, socialization has more of an effect on cosponsorship activity. Legal 
education results in a modestly significant relationship, yet in the negative direction (b = -
0.042, Z = -1.80). Contrary to my original hypothesis, the acquisition of a Juris Doctorate 
actually depresses the cosponsorship activity of those members. Service in the military, 
as well, decreases cosponsorship activity (b = -0.057, Z = -2.20) and is also statistically 
significant. As with the model of sponsorship, service as a state or local official has a 
positive effect on cosponsorship behavior (b = 0.071, Z = 3.20). Work experience as an 
aide or staff member neither affects sponsorship nor cosponsorship activity according to 
this model.  
  Leadership variables were hypothesized to show the strongest relationship to the 
sponsorship model. In fact, only seniority (b = -0.010, Z = -6.19) and gender (b = 0.139, 
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Z = 3.05) resulted in statistically significant coefficients. Seniority, however, produced 
negative coefficients meaning that the more experienced a legislator becomes, the less 
he/she cosponsors. This could indicate that these members are not sending their signals 
by-way of cosponsorship; rather the sponsorship model does support the notion that 
senior members are communicating through the sponsorship of legislation.  
  The spatial variables produced exciting results for the cosponsorship model. Each 
variable revealed a strong, statistically significant coefficient. Both Poole and Rosenthal 
measures of ideology, party, district median income, and electoral margin have 
coefficients that are significant. Having extreme political views positively relates to 
cosponsorship activity (b = 0.438, Z = 5.99). The political actors who represent 
ideological extremism are likely cosponsoring, as well as sponsoring, higher amounts of 
legislation in the attempt to have their strong opinions heard by other members of 
Congress and possibly by their constituencies. Median income was used as a surrogate 
measure of the member’s district political activeness and was expected to have a positive 
effect on legislative activity. This variable did not produce a relationship in the 
hypothesized direction, yet it did result in a statistically significant negative one (b = -
0.000003, Z = -3.41). Additionally, party (b = 0.137, Z = 2.71) should have resulted in 
negative coefficients, but produced a significant positive relationship. Electorally safer 
members of Congress also become more active legislators (b = 0.0012, Z = 2.56) than 
their peers coming from more competitive elections. This is a very interesting 
relationship which also lends support to the signaling perspective. It may be argued that 
those members of Congress who were elected in close elections would sponsor and 
cosponsor several bills in order to appeal to their constituencies; the theory being that 
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activity brings about support and reelection. However, my results indicate that the 
electorally safe legislators are more active. Therefore, these members of Congress are 
likely using legislative activity in order to signal internally, rather than externally. Future 
research which includes a measure of the content of these bills would be an interesting 
addition to the relationship.  
  Finally, the effect of the unrestricted ability to cosponsor legislation resulted in a 
strong statistically significant coefficient (b = 0.535, Z = 23.24). This solidifies the 
observation, noticeable in Figure 2, that the changes in 1978 had a significant impact on 
legislative activity. This freedom also negatively impacted sponsorship activity (b = -
0.692, Z = -18.87). 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 While this study seeks to advance understanding of sponsorship and 
cosponsorship activity, it also reveals several avenues for future research. I have 
examined some basic hypotheses, some based on previous scholarly research, and others 
which have not been thoroughly studied. Because many of my hypotheses resulted in 
statistically significant correlations in the opposite direction from what I expected, 
additional research and review of conventional thought is necessary.  
I use data from the 93rd through 107th Congresses to empirically test 
comprehensive models of sponsorship and cosponsorship. This study has revealed the 
effects of a wide range of independent variables—committee and subcommittee chair 
status, gender, partisan affiliation, and ideological extremism—on legislative activity. 
There remains, however, a need for additional research which incorporates various 
previous attempts to understand cosponsorship and sponsorship behavior.  
One possibility is to integrate the idea that members of Congress are strategically 
acting in order to further their personal careers in politics. Incorporating individual 
members of Congress’ actions on specific pieces of legislation, while maintaining the 
aggregate data, could reveal more of the underlying motivations of members to sponsor 
and cosponsor legislation. Additionally, incorporating a measure of content for specified 
bills could allow a researcher to see if members of Congress sponsor and cosponsor more 
distributive legislation that could benefit their constituencies, which, in turn, facilitates 
their own reelection. Results to the opposite effect would further strengthen my findings 
here which indicate empirical support for the signaling perspective; members of Congress 
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are using sponsorship and cosponsorship activity for internal signaling purposes, as 
opposed to external signaling. 
This study has produced some interesting and intriguing results. It has 
strengthened some previously hypothesized directional relationships, such as sponsoring 
and cosponsoring are used as a signaling device, while other relationships including the 
socialization aspect of legislative activity were not empirically supported. The intent of 
this study was to provide a generalizeble model of sponsorship and cosponsorship 
activity in the U.S. House of Representatives. I feel that this project has accomplished 
much of its objective. A framework of general sponsorship and cosponsorship activity 
has begun with this study. Combining existing, more specific, studies and expanding the 
theoretical underpinning along with this foundation are likely to yield even more 
significant relationships between background characteristics and legislative activity.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Variable         Description 
Sponsorship activity Number of bills sponsored by House member in 
a given Congress. 
 
Cosponsorship activity     Number of bills cosponsored by House member 
in a given Congress. 
 
Party          1 = Republican party member; 0= Democratic  
           party member. 
 
DW-Nominate Scores Scale of ideological conservatism, derived from 
Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) DW-Nominate 
scores. 
 
Folded DW-Nominate Scores Scale of ideological intensity, computed as the 
absolute value of Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-
Nominate scores. 
 
Attorney         1 = House member is an attorney; 0 = 
otherwise. 
 
Military         1 = House member served in the military; 0 = 
otherwise. 
 
Former congressional staffer 1 = House member served previously as 
congressional staff member; 0 = otherwise. 
 
Former state legislator     1 = House member served previously as a 
member of the state legislature; 0 = otherwise. 
 
Former state or local elected official  1 = House member is a former state or local 
elected official; 0 = otherwise. 
 
Seniority         Number of years since House member first 
elected to Congress. 
 
Party leader        1 = party leader (Speaker, majority or minority 
leader, majority or minority whip); 0 = 
otherwise. 
 
Committee chair       1 = House member serves as a committee chair; 
0 = otherwise. 
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APPENDIX (CONTINUED) 
 
Variable         Description 
Subcommittee chair      1 = House member serves as a subcommittee 
chair; 0 = otherwise. 
 
Gender         1 = House member is female; 0 = House 
member is male. 
 
Median family income     Median family income (in dollars). 
 
Election vote percentage     Raw percentage of the vote received by House 
member in the immediately preceding election. 
 
Cosponsorship reform (post 1978)  1 = 96th through 107th Congresses (1979-2002); 
0 = 93rd through 95th Congresses (1973-1978). 
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